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Abstract
We study the power of different types of adaptive (nonoblivious) adversaries in the setting of prediction with
expert advice, under both full-information and bandit feedback. We measure the player’s performance using a new
notion of regret, also known as policy regret, which better captures the adversary’s adaptiveness to the player’s
behavior. In a setting where losses are allowed to drift, we characterize —in a nearly complete manner— the power
of adaptive adversaries with bounded memories and switching costs. In particular, we show that with switching costs,
the attainable rate with bandit feedback is Θ˜(T 2/3). Interestingly, this rate is significantly worse than the Θ(
√
T )
rate attainable with switching costs in the full-information case. Via a novel reduction from experts to bandits, we
also show that a bounded memory adversary can force Θ˜(T 2/3) regret even in the full information case, proving that
switching costs are easier to control than bounded memory adversaries. Our lower bounds rely on a new stochastic
adversary strategy that generates loss processes with strong dependencies.
1 Introduction
An important instance of the framework of prediction with expert advice —see, e.g., Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006]—
is defined as the following repeated game, between a randomized player with a finite and fixed set of available actions
and an adversary. At the beginning of each round of the game, the adversary assigns a loss to each action. Next,
the player defines a probability distribution over the actions, draws an action from this distribution, and suffers the
loss associated with that action. The player’s goal is to accumulate loss at the smallest possible rate, as the game
progresses. Two versions of this game are typically considered: in the full-information feedback version of the game,
at the end of each round, the player observes the adversary’s assignment of loss values to each action. In the bandit
feedback version, the player only observes the loss associated with his chosen action, but not the loss values of other
actions.
We assume that the adversary is adaptive (also called nonoblivious by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006] or reac-
tive by Maillard and Munos [2010]), which means that the adversary chooses the loss values on round t based on the
player’s actions on rounds 1 . . . t− 1. We also assume that the adversary is deterministic and has unlimited computa-
tional power. These assumptions imply that the adversary can specify his entire strategy before the game begins. In
other words, the adversary can perform all of the calculations needed to specify, in advance, how he plans to react on
each round to any sequence of actions chosen by the player.
More formally, let A denote the finite set of actions and let Xt denote the player’s random action on round t. We
adopt the notation X1:t as shorthand for the sequence X1 . . . Xt. We assume that the adversary defines, in advance,
a sequence of history-dependent loss functions f1, f2, . . .. The input to each loss function ft is the entire history of
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the player’s actions so far, therefore the player’s loss on round t is ft(X1:t). Note that the player doesn’t observe the
functions ft, only the losses that result from his past actions. Specifically, in the bandit feedback model, the player
observes ft(X1:t) on round t, whereas in the full-information model, the player observes ft(X1:t−1, x) for all x ∈ A.
On any round T , we evaluate the player’s performance so far using the notion of regret, which compares his
cumulative loss on the first T rounds to the cumulative loss of the best fixed action in hindsight. Formally, the player’s
regret on round T is defined as
RT =
T∑
t=1
ft(X1:t)−min
x∈A
T∑
t=1
ft(x . . . x) . (1)
RT is a random variable, as it depends on the randomized action sequence X1:t. Therefore, we also consider the
expected regret E[RT ]. This definition is the same as the one used in Merhav et al. [2002] and Arora et al. [2012] (in
the latter, it is called policy regret), but differs from the more common definition of expected regret
E
[
T∑
t=1
ft(X1:t)−min
x∈A
T∑
t=1
ft(X1:t−1, x)
]
. (2)
The definition in Eq. (2) is more common in the literature (e.g., Auer et al. [2002], McMahan and Blum [2004],
Dani and Hayes [2006], Maillard and Munos [2010]), but is clearly inadequate for measuring a player’s performance
against an adaptive adversary. Indeed, if the adversary is adaptive, the quantity ft(X1:t−1, x)is hardly interpretable
—see Arora et al. [2012] for a more detailed discussion.
In general, we seek algorithms for which E[RT ] can be bounded by a sublinear function of T , implying that the
per-round expected regret, E[RT ]/T , tends to zero. Unfortunately, Arora et al. [2012] shows that arbitrary adaptive
adversaries can easily force the regret to grow linearly. Thus, we need to focus on (reasonably) weaker adversaries,
which have constraints on the loss functions they can generate.
The weakest adversary we discuss is the oblivious adversary, which determines the loss on round t based only on
the current action Xt. In other words, this adversary is oblivious to the player’s past actions. Formally, the oblivious
adversary is constrained to choose a sequence of loss functions that satisfies ∀t, ∀x1:t ∈ At, and ∀x′1:t−1 ∈ At−1,
ft(x1:t) = ft(x
′
1:t−1, xt) . (3)
The majority of previous work in online learning focuses on oblivious adversaries. When dealing with oblivious
adversaries, we denote the loss function by ℓt and omit the first t− 1 arguments. With this notation, the loss at time t
is simply written as ℓt(Xt).
For example, imagine an investor that invests in a single stock at a time. On each trading day he invests in one
stock and suffers losses accordingly. In this example, the investor is the player and the stock market is the adversary.
If the investment amount is small, the investor’s actions will have no measurable effect on the market, so the market is
oblivious to the investor’s actions. Also note that this example relates to the full-information feedback version of the
game, as the investor can see the performance of each stock at the end of each trading day.
A stronger adversary is the oblivious adversary with switching costs. This adversary is similar to the oblivious
adversary defined above, but charges the player an additional switching cost of 1 whenever Xt 6= Xt−1. More
formally, this adversary defines his sequence of loss functions in two steps: first he chooses an oblivious sequence of
loss functions, ℓ1, ℓ2 . . ., which satisfies the constraint in Eq. (3). Then, he sets f1(x) = ℓ1(x), and
∀ t ≥ 2, ft(x1:t) = ℓt(xt) + I{xt 6=xt−1} . (4)
This is a very natural setting. For example, let us consider again the single-stock investor, but now assume that
each trade has a fixed commission cost. If the investor keeps his position in a stock for multiple trading days, he is
exempt from any additional fees, but when he sells one stock and buys another, he incurs a fixed commission. More
generally, this setting (or simple generalizations of it) allows us to capture any situation where choosing a different
action involves a costly change of state. In the paper, we will also discuss a special case of this adversary, where the
loss function ℓt(x) for each action is sampled i.i.d. from a fixed distribution.
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The switching costs adversary defines the loss on round t as a function of Xt and Xt−1, and is therefore a special
case of a more general adversary called an adaptive adversary with a memory of 1. This adversary is constrained to
choose loss functions that satisfy ∀t, ∀x1:t ∈ At, and ∀x′1:t−2 ∈ At−2,
ft(x1:t) = ft(x
′
1:t−2, xt−1, xt) . (5)
This adversary is more general than the switching costs adversary because his loss functions can depend on the pre-
vious action in an arbitrary way. We can further strengthen this adversary and define the bounded memory adaptive
adversary, which has a bounded memory of an arbitrary size. In other words, this adversary is allowed to set his loss
function based on the player’s m most recent past actions, where m is a predefined parameter. Formally, the bounded
memory adversary must choose loss functions that satisfy, ∀t, ∀x1:t ∈ At, and ∀x′1:t−m−1 ∈ At−m−1,
ft(x1:t) = ft(x
′
1:t−m−1, xt−m:t) .
In the information theory literature, this setting is called individual sequence prediction against loss functions with
memory Merhav et al. [2002].
In addition to the adversary types described above, the bounded memory adaptive adversary has additional inter-
esting special cases. One of them is the delayed feedback oblivious adversary of Mesterharm [2005], which defines an
oblivious loss sequence, but reveals each loss value with a delay of m rounds. Since the loss at time t depends on the
player’s action at time t−m, this adversary is a special case of a bounded memory adversary with a memory of size
m. The delayed feedback adversary is not a focus of our work, and we present it merely as an interesting special case.
So far, we have defined a succession of adversaries of different strengths. This paper’s goal is to understand the
upper and lower bounds on the player’s regret when he faces these adversaries. Specifically, we focus on how the
expected regret depends on the number of rounds, T , with either full-information or bandit feedback.
1.1 The Current State of the Art
Different aspects of this problem have been previously studied and the known results are surveyed below and summa-
rized in Table 1. Most of these previous results rely on the additional assumption that the range of the loss functions
is bounded in a fixed interval, say [0, C]. We explicitly make note of this because our new results require us to slightly
generalize this assumption.
As mentioned above, the oblivious adversary has been studied extensively and is the best understood of all the ad-
versaries discussed in this paper. With full-information feedback, both the Hedge algorithm Littlestone and Warmuth
[1994], Freund and Schapire [1997] and the follow the perturbed leader (FPL) algorithm Kalai and Vempala [2005]
guarantee a regret of O(
√
T ), with a matching lower bound of Ω(
√
T ) —see, e.g., Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006].
Analyses of Hedge in settings where the loss range may vary over time have also been considered —see, e.g.,
Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2007]. The oblivious setting with bandit feedback, where the player only observes the incurred
loss ft(X1:t), is called the nonstochastic (or adversarial) multi-armed bandit problem. In this setting, the Exp3
algorithm of Auer et al. [2002] guarantees the same regret O(√T ) as the full-information setting, and clearly the
full-information lower bound Ω(
√
T ) still applies.
The follow the lazy leader (FLL) algorithm of Kalai and Vempala [2005] is designed for the switching costs setting
with full-information feedback. The analysis of FLL guarantees that the oblivious component of the player’s expected
regret (without counting the switching costs), as well as the expected number of switches, is upper bounded byO(
√
T ),
implying an expected regret of at most O(√T ).
The algorithm of Merhav et al. [2002] focuses on the bounded memory adversary with full-information feedback,
referring to this problem as loss functions with memory, and guaranteeing a regret ofO(T 2/3). The work of Arora et al.
[2012] extends this result to the bandit feedback case, maintaining the same regret bound.
Learning with bandit feedback and switching costs has mostly been considered in the economics literature, using
a different setting than ours and with prior knowledge assumptions (see Jun [2004] for an overview). The setting
of stochastic oblivious adversaries (i.e., oblivious loss functions sampled i.i.d. from a fixed distribution) was first
studied by Agrawal et al. [1988], where they show that O(log T ) switches are sufficient to asymptotically guarantee
logarithmic regret. The paper Ortner [2010] achieves logarithmic regret nonasymptotically with O(logT ) switches.
3
oblivious switching cost memory of size 1 bounded memory adaptive
Full-Information Feedback
O˜ √T √T T 2/3 T 2/3 T
Ω
√
T
√
T
√
T
√
T → T 2/3 T
Bandit Feedback
O˜ √T T 2/3 T 2/3 T 2/3 T
Ω
√
T
√
T → T 2/3 √T → T 2/3 √T → T 2/3 T
Table 1: State-of-the-art upper and lower bounds on regret (as a function of T ) against different adversary types. Our
contribution to this table is presented in bold face.
Several other papers discuss online learning against “adaptive” adversaries Auer et al. [2002], Dani and Hayes
[2006], Maillard and Munos [2010], McMahan and Blum [2004], but these results are not relevant to our work and can
be easily misunderstood. For example, even the Exp3 algorithm of Auer et al. [2002] has extensions to the “adaptive”
adversary case, with a regret upper bound ofO(
√
T ). This bound doesn’t contradict the Ω(T ) lower bound for general
adaptive adversaries mentioned earlier, since these papers use the regret defined in Eq. (2) rather than the regret used
in our work, defined in Eq. (1).
Another related body of work lies in the field of competitive analysis —see Borodin and El-Yaniv [1998], which
also deals with loss functions that depend on the player’s past actions, and the adversary’s memory may even be
unbounded. However, obtaining sublinear regret is generally impossible in this case. Therefore, competitive analysis
studies much weaker performance metrics such as the competitive ratio, making it orthogonal to our work.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we make the following contributions (see Table 1):
• Our main technical contribution is a new lower bound on regret that matches the existing upper bounds in
several of the settings discussed above. Specifically, our lower bound applies to the switching costs adversary
with bandit feedback and to all strictly stronger adversaries.
• Building on this lower bound, we prove another regret lower bound in the bounded memory setting with full-
information feedback, again matching the known upper bound.
• We confirm that existing upper bounds on regret hold in our setting and match the lower bounds up to logarithmic
factors.
• Despite the lower bound, we show that for switching costs and bandit feedback, if we also assume stochastic i.i.d.
losses, then one can get a distribution-free regret bound of O(√T log log logT ) for finite action sets, with only
O(log logT ) switches. This result uses ideas from Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2013], and is deferred to Appendix A.
Our new lower bound is a significant step towards a complete understanding of adaptive adversaries; observe that the
upper and lower bounds in Table 1 essentially match in all but one of the settings.
Our results have two important consequences. First, observe that the optimal regret against the switching costs
adversary is Θ
(√
T
)
with full-information feedback, versus Θ
(
T 2/3
)
with bandit feedback. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first theoretical confirmation that learning with bandit feedback is strictly harder than learning with
full-information, even on a small finite action set and even in terms of the dependence on T (previous gaps we are
aware of were either in terms of the number of actions Auer et al. [2002], or required large or continuous action spaces
—see, e.g., Bubeck et al. [2011], Shamir [2012]). Moreover, recall the regret bound of O(√T log log log T ) against
the stochastic i.i.d. adversary with switching costs and bandit feedback. This demonstrates that dependencies in the
loss process must play a crucial role in controlling the power of the switching costs adversary. Indeed, the Ω
(
T 2/3
)
lower bound proven in the next section heavily relies on such dependencies.
Second, observe that in the full-information feedback case, the optimal regret against a switching costs adversary
is Θ(
√
T ), whereas the optimal regret against the more general bounded memory adversary is Ω(T 2/3). This is
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somewhat surprising given the ideas presented in Merhav et al. [2002] and later extended in Arora et al. [2012]: The
main technique used in these papers is to take an algorithm originally designed for oblivious adversaries, forcefully
prevent it from switching actions very often, and obtain a new algorithm that guarantees a regret of O(T 2/3) against
bounded memory adversaries. This would seem to imply that a small number of switches is the key to dealing with
general bounded memory adversaries. Our result contradicts this intuition by showing that controlling the number of
switches is easier then dealing with a general bounded memory adversary.
As noted above, our lower bounds require us to slightly weaken the standard technical assumption that loss values
lie in a fixed interval [0, C]. We replace it with the following two assumptions:
1. Bounded range. We assume that the loss values on each individual round are bounded in an interval of constant
size C, but we allow this interval to drift from round to round. Formally, ∀t, ∀x1:t ∈ At and ∀x′1:t ∈ At,∣∣ft(x1:t)− ft(x′1:t)∣∣ ≤ C . (6)
2. Bounded drift. We also assume that the drift of each individual action from round to round is contained in a
bounded interval of size Dt, where Dt may grow slowly, as O
(√
log(t)
)
. Formally, ∀t and ∀x1:t ∈ At,∣∣ft(x1:t)− ft+1(x1:t, xt)∣∣ ≤ Dt . (7)
Since these assumptions are a relaxation of the standard assumption, all of the known lower bounds on regret auto-
matically extend to our relaxed setting. For our results to be consistent with the current state of the art, we must also
prove that all of the known upper bounds continue to hold after the relaxation, up to logarithmic factors.
2 Lower Bounds
In this section, we prove lower bounds on the player’s expected regret in various settings.
2.1 Ω(T 2/3) with Switching Costs and Bandit Feedback
We begin with a Ω(T 2/3) regret lower bound against an oblivious adversary with switching costs, when the player
receives bandit feedback. It is enough to consider a very simple setting, with only two actions, labeled 1 and 2. Using
the notation introduced earlier, we use ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . to denote the oblivious sequence of loss functions chosen by the
adversary before adding the switching cost.
Theorem 1. For any player strategy that relies on bandit feedback and for any number of rounds T , there exist loss
functions f1, . . . , fT that are oblivious with switching costs, with a range bounded by C = 2, and a drift bounded by
Dt =
√
3 log(t) + 16, such that E[RT ] ≥ 140T 2/3.
The full proof is given in Appendix B, and here we give an informal proof sketch. We begin by constructing a ran-
domized adversarial strategy, where the loss functions ℓ1, . . . , ℓT are an instantiation of random variables Lt, . . . , LT
defined as follows. Let ξ1, . . . , ξT be i.i.d. standard Gaussian random variables (with zero mean and unit variance)
and let Z be a random variable that equals −1 or 1 with equal probability. Using these random variables, define for all
t = 1 . . . T
Lt(1) =
t∑
s=1
ξs ,
Lt(2) = Lt(1) + ZT
−1/3 . (8)
In words, {Lt(1)}Tt=1 is simply a Gaussian random walk and {Lt(2)}Tt=1 is the same random walk, slightly shifted
up or down —see figure 1 for an illustration. It is straightforward to confirm that this loss sequence has a bounded
range, as required by the theorem: by construction we have |ℓt(1) − ℓt(2)| = T−1/3 ≤ 1 for all t, and since the
switching cost can add at most 1 to the loss on each round, we conclude that |ft(1) − ft(2)| ≤ 2 for all t. Next, we
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Figure 1: A particular realization of the random loss sequence defined in Eq. (8). The sequence of losses for action
1 follows a Gaussian random walk, whereas the sequence of losses for action 2 follows the same random walk, but
slightly shifted either up or down.
show that the expected regret of any player against this random loss sequence is Ω(T 2/3), where expectation is taken
over the randomization of both the adversary and the player. The intuition is that the player can only gain information
about which action is better by switching between them. Otherwise, if he stays on the same action, he only observes a
random walk, and gets no further information. Since the gap between the two losses on each round is T−1/3, the player
must perform Ω(T 2/3) switches before he can identify the better action. If the player performs that many switches, the
total regret incurred due to the switching costs is Ω(T 2/3). Alternatively, if the player performs o(T 2/3) switches, he
can’t identify the better action; as a result he suffers an expected regret of Ω(T−1/3) on each round and a total regret
of Ω(T 2/3).
Since the randomized loss sequence defined in Eq. (8), plus a switching cost, achieves an expected regret of
Ω(T 2/3), there must exist at least one deterministic loss sequence ℓ1 . . . ℓT with a regret of Ω(T 2/3). In our proof, we
show that there exists such ℓ1 . . . ℓT with bounded drift.
2.2 Ω(T 2/3) with Bounded Memory and Full-Information Feedback
We build on Thm. 1 and prove a Ω(T 2/3) regret lower bound in the full-information setting, where we get to see the
entire loss vector on every round. To get this strong result, we need to give the adversary a little bit of extra power:
memory of size 2 instead of size 1 as in the case of switching costs. To show this result, we again consider a simple
setting with two actions.
Theorem 2. For any player strategy that relies on full-information feedback and for any number of rounds T ≥ 2,
there exist loss functions f1, . . . , fT , each with a memory of size m = 2, a range bounded by C = 2, and a drift
bounded by Dt =
√
3 log(t) + 18, such that E[RT ] ≥ 140 (T − 1)2/3.
The formal proof is deferred to Appendix C and a proof sketch is given here. The proof is based on a reduction
from full-information to bandit feedback that might be of independent interest. We construct the adversarial loss
sequence as follows: on each round, the adversary assigns the same loss to both actions. Namely, the value of the
loss depends only on the player’s previous two actions, and not on his action on the current round. Recall that even
in the full-information version of the game, the player doesn’t know what the losses would have been had he chosen
different actions in the past. Therefore, we have made the full-information game as difficult as the bandit game.
Specifically, we construct an oblivious loss sequence ℓ1 . . . ℓT as in Thm. 1 and define
ft(x1:t) = ℓt−1(xt−1) + I{xt−1 6=xt−2} . (9)
In words, we define the loss on round t of the full-information game to be equal to the loss on round t− 1 of a bandits-
with-switching-costs game in which the player chooses the same sequence of actions. This can be done with a memory
of size 2, since the loss in Eq. (9) is fully specified by the player’s choices on rounds t, t − 1, t − 2. Therefore, the
Ω(T 2/3) lower bound for switching costs and bandit feedback extends to the full-information setting with a memory
of size at least 2.
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3 Upper Bounds
In this section, we show that the known upper bounds on regret, originally proved for bounded losses, can be extended
to the case of losses with bounded range and bounded drift. Specifically, of the upper bounds that appear in Table 1,
we prove the following:
• O(
√
T ) for an oblivious adversary with switching costs, with full-information feedback.
• O˜(√T ) for an oblivious adversary with bandit feedback (where O˜ hides logarithmic factors).
• O˜(T 2/3) for a bounded memory adversary with bandit feedback.
The remaining upper bounds in Table 1 are either trivial or follow from the principle that an upper bound still holds if
we weaken the adversary or provide a more informative feedback.
3.1 O(√T ) with Switching Costs and Full-Information Feedback
In this setting, ft(x1:t) = ℓt(xt)+ I{xt 6=xt−1}. If the oblivious losses ℓ1 . . . ℓT (without the additional switching costs)
were all bounded in [0, 1], the Follow the Lazy Leader (FLL) algorithm of Kalai and Vempala [2005] would guarantee
a regret of O(√T ) with respect to these losses (again, without the additional switching costs). Additionally, FLL
guarantees that its expected number of switches is O(√T ). We use a simple reduction to extend these guarantees to
loss functions with a range bounded in an interval of size C and with an arbitrary drift.
On round t, after choosing an action and receiving the loss function ℓt, the player defines the modified loss ℓ′t(x) =
1
C−1
(
ℓt(x) −miny ℓt(y)
)
and feeds it to the FLL algorithm. The FLL algorithm then chooses the next action.
Theorem 3. If each of the loss functions f1, f2, . . . is oblivious with switching costs and has a range bounded by C
then the player strategy described above attains O(C√T ) expected regret.
The formal proof is given in Appendix D but the proof technique is quite straightforward. We first show that each
ℓ′t is bounded in [0, 1] and therefore the standard regret bound for FLL holds with respect to the sequence of modified
loss functions ℓ′1, ℓ′2, . . .. Then we show that the guarantees provided for FLL imply a regret of O(
√
T ) with respect
to the original loss sequence f1, f2, . . ..
3.2 O˜(√T ) with an Oblivious Adversary and Bandit Feedback
In this setting, ft(x1:t) simply equals ℓt(xt). The reduction described in the previous subsection cannot be used
in the bandit setting, since minx ℓt(x) is unknown to the player, and a different reduction is needed. The player
sets a fixed horizon T and focuses on controlling his regret at time T ; he can then use a standard doubling trick
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006] to handle an infinite horizon. The player uses the fact that each ft has a range
bounded by C. Additionally, he defines D = maxt≤T Dt and on each round he defines the modified loss
f ′t(x1:t) =
1
2(C +D)
(
ℓt(xt)− ℓt−1(xt−1)
)
+
1
2
. (10)
Note that f ′t(X1:t) can be computed by the player using only bandit feedback. The player then feeds f ′t(X1:t) to
an algorithm that guarantees a O(
√
T ) standard regret (see definition in Eq. (2)) against an adaptive adversary. The
Exp3.P algorithm, due to Auer et al. [2002], is such an algorithm. The player chooses his actions according to the
choices made by Exp3.P. The following theorem states that this reduction results in a bandit algorithm that guarantees
a regret of O˜(
√
T ) against oblivious adversaries.
Theorem 4. If each of the loss functions f1 . . . fT is oblivious with a range bounded by C and a drift bounded by
Dt = O
(√
log(t)
)
then the player strategy described above attains O˜(C√T ) expected regret.
The full proof is given in Appendix D. In a nutshell, we show that each f ′t is an adaptive loss function bounded in
[0, 1] and therefore the analysis of Exp3.P guarantees a regret of O(√T ) with respect to the loss sequence f ′1 . . . f ′T .
Then, we show that this guarantee implies a regret of (C +D)O(√T ) = O˜(C√T ) with respect to the original loss
sequence f1 . . . fT .
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3.3 O˜(T 2/3) with Bounded Memory and Bandit Feedback
Proving an upper bound against an adversary with a memory of size m, with bandit feedback, requires a more delicate
reduction. As in the previous section, we assume a finite horizon T and we let D = maxtDt. Let K = |A| be the
number of actions available to the player.
Since fT (x1:t) depends only on the last m + 1 actions in x1:t, we slightly overload our notation and define
ft(xt−m:t) to mean the same as ft(x1:t). To define the reduction, the player fixes a base action x0 ∈ A and for each
t > m he defines the loss function
f̂t(xt−m:t) =
1
2
(
C + (m+ 1)D
)(ft(xt−m:t)− ft−m−1(x0 . . . x0))+ 1
2
.
Next, he divides the T rounds into J consecutive epochs of equal length, where J = Θ(T 2/3). We assume that the
epoch length T/J is at least 2K(m+ 1), which is true when T is sufficiently large. At the beginning of each epoch,
the player plans his action sequence for the entire epoch. He uses some of the rounds in the epoch for exploration and
the rest for exploitation. For each action in A, the player chooses an exploration interval of 2(m + 1) consecutive
rounds within the epoch. These K intervals are chosen randomly, but they are not allowed to overlap, giving a total of
2K(m+ 1) exploration rounds in the epoch. The details of how these intervals are drawn appears in our analysis, in
Appendix D. The remaining T/J − 2K(m+ 1) rounds are used for exploitation.
The player runs the Hedge algorithm Freund and Schapire [1997] in the background, invoking it only at the be-
ginning of each epoch and using it to choose one exploitation action that will be played consistently on all of the
exploitation rounds in the epoch. In the exploration interval for action x, the player first plays m + 1 rounds of the
base action x0 followed by m + 1 rounds of the action x. Letting tx denote the first round in this interval, the player
uses the observed losses ftx+m(x0 . . . x0) and ftx+2m+1(x . . . x) to compute f̂tx+2m+1(x . . . x). In our analysis, we
show that the latter is an unbiased estimate of the average value of f̂t(x . . . x) over t in the epoch. At the end of the
epoch, the K estimates are fed as feedback to the Hedge algorithm.
We prove the following regret bound, with the proof deferred to Appendix D.
Theorem 5. If each of the loss functions f1 . . . fT is has a memory of size m, a range bounded by C, and a drift
bounded by Dt = O
(√
log(t)
)
then the player strategy described above attains O˜(T 2/3) expected regret.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we studied the problem of prediction with expert advice against different types of adversaries, ranging
from the oblivious adversary to the general adaptive adversary. We proved upper and lower bounds on the player’s
regret against each of these adversary types, in both the full-information and the bandit feedback models. Our lower
bounds essentially matched our upper bounds in all but one case: the adaptive adversary with a unit memory in the
full-information setting, where we only know that regret is Ω(
√
T ) and O(T 2/3).
Our new bounds have two important consequences. First, we characterize the regret attainable with switching
costs, and show a setting where predicting with bandit feedback is strictly more difficult than predicting with full-
information feedback —even in terms of the dependence on T , and even on small finite action sets. Second, in the
full-information setting, we show that predicting against a switching costs adversary is strictly easier than predicting
against an arbitrary adversary with a bounded memory.
To obtain our results, we had to slightly relax the standard assumption that loss values are bounded in [0, 1].
Re-introducing this assumption and proving similar lower bounds remains an elusive open problem. Many other
questions remain unanswered. Can we characterize the dependence of the regret on the size of the action set A? Can
we strengthen any of our expected regret bounds to bounds that hold with high probability? Can any of our results be
generalized to more sophisticated notions of regret, such as shifting regret and swap regret, as in Arora et al. [2012]?
In addition to the adversary types discussed in this paper, there are other interesting classes of adversaries that
lie between the oblivious and the adaptive. One of these is the oblivious adversary with delayed feedback, briefly
mentioned in the introduction. While some results for this adversary exist (see Mesterharm [2005]), the attainable
regret, especially in the bandit feedback case, is not clear. Another interesting case is the family of deterministically
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adaptive adversaries, which includes adversaries that adapt to the player’s actions (so they are not oblivious) in a
known deterministic way, rather than in a secret malicious way. For example, imagine playing a multi-armed bandit
game where the loss values are initially oblivious, but whenever the player chooses an arm with zero loss, the loss of
the same arm on the next round is deterministically changed to zero. In other words, whenever the player suffers a zero
loss, he knows that choosing the same arm again guarantees another zero loss. This is an important setting because
many real-world online prediction scenarios are indeed deterministically adaptive.
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Appendices
A Distribution-free regret bound for bandits with switching costs
In this appendix we adapt results of Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2013] to show a strategy that achieves O(√T log log logT )
regret against any i.i.d. oblivious adversary in the bandit setting with switching costs, assuming a finite action set
A = {1 . . .K}. The strategy used by this stochastic adversary is specified by a probability distribution over oblivious
loss functions. The oblivious loss function for each step t = 1, 2, . . . is the realization on an independent draw Lt
from this distribution. The regret of a player choosing actions X0 = X1, X2, . . . is defined by
RT =
T∑
t=1
Et
[
Lt(Xt) + I{Xt 6=Xt−1}
]−min
x∈A
T∑
t=1
E
[
Lt(x)
]
where the expectation E is over the random draw of each Lt and the possible randomization of the player, and the
expectation Et is conditioned over X1, L1(X1), . . . , Xt−1, Lt−1(Xt−1).
Our result focuses on loss distributions such that the law of each marginal L1(x) is subgaussian. A random
variable Z is subgaussian if there exist constants b, c such that for any a > 0 P
(
Z > EZ + a
) ≤ be−ca2 and
P
(
Z < EZ − a) ≤ be−ca2 . One can then show that, for any i.i.d. sequence Z1, . . . , ZT of subgaussian random
variables,
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
Zt − EZ1
∣∣∣∣∣ >
√
112b
cT
ln
1
δ
)
≤ δ . (11)
In the following, we use the notation E
[
Lt(x)
]
= µ(x) and µ∗ = min
x∈A
µ(x) .
Theorem 6. Consider a finite action set A = {1 . . .K}. Then for each T there exists a deterministic player
strategy for the bandit game with i.i.d. oblivious adversaries and switching costs, whose regret after T steps is
O(√T log log logT ) with high probability, provided the distribution of L1(x) is sugaussian for each x ∈ A.
Proof. Consider the following player that proceeds in stages. At each stage s = 1, 2, . . . , S, the player maintains a set
As ⊆ A of active actions. Each action is played Ts/|As| times in a round-robin fashion, where Ts = T 1−2−s is the
total number of plays in stage s and T is the known horizon. Note that the overall number of switches is at most KS,
where
S = min
{
j ∈ N :
j∑
s=1
Ts ≥ T
}
= O(ln lnT ) .
Let µ̂s(x) the sample mean of losses for action x in stage s, and define
x̂s = argmin
x∈As
µ̂s(x)
the best empirical action in stage s. The sets As of active actions are defined as follows: A1 = A and
As =
{
x ∈ Ai−1 : µ̂s−1(x) ≤ µ̂s−1(x̂s−1) + 2Cs−1
}
where
Cs =
√
112(b/c)
K
Ts
ln
KS
δ
.
Note that AS ⊆ · · · ⊆ A1 by construction. Also, using (11) and the union bound we have that
max
x∈As
∣∣µ̂s(x) − µ(x)∣∣ ≤ Cs (12)
simultaneously for all s = 1, . . . , S with probability at least 1− δ.
We claim the following.
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Claim 1. With probability at least 1− δ,
x∗ ∈
S⋂
s=1
As and 0 ≤ µ̂s(x∗)− µ̂s(x̂s) ≤ 2Cs for all s = 1, . . . , S.
Proof of Claim. We prove the lemma by induction on s = 1, . . . , S. We first show that the base case s = 1 holds with
probability at least 1− δ/S. Then we show that if the claim holds for s− 1, then it holds for s with probability at least
1 − δ/S over all random events in stage s. Therefore, using a union bound over s = 1, . . . , S we get that the claim
holds simultaneously for all s with probability at least 1− δ.
For the base case s = 1 note that x∗ ∈ A1 by definition, and thus µ̂1(x̂1) ≤ µ̂1(x∗) holds. Moreover, using (12)
we obtain that
µ̂1(x
∗)− µ(x∗) ≤ C1 and µ(x̂1)− µ̂1(x̂1) ≤ C1
holds with probability at least 1− δ/S. Since µ(x∗)− µ(x̂1) ≤ 0 by definition of x∗, we obtain
0 ≤ µ̂1(x∗)− µ̂1(x̂1) ≤ 2C1
as required. We now prove the claim for s > 1 using the inductive assumption
x∗ ∈ As−1 and 0 ≤ µ̂s−1(x∗)− µ̂s−1(x̂s−1) ≤ 2Cs−1 .
The inductive assumption directly implies that x∗ ∈ As. Thus we have µ̂i(x̂s) ≤ µ̂s(x∗), because x̂s minimizes µ̂s
over a set that contains x∗. The rest of the proof of the claim closely follows that of the base case s = 1. 
Now, for any s = 1, . . . , S and for any x ∈ As we have that
µ(x)− µ(x∗) ≤ µ̂s−1(x)− µ(x∗) + Cs−1 by (12)
≤ µ̂s−1(x̂s−1)− µ(x∗) + 3Cs−1 by definition of As−1, since x ∈ As ⊆ As−1
≤ µ̂s−1(x∗)− µ(x∗) + 3Cs−1 since x̂s−1 minimizes µ̂s−1 in As−1
≤ 4Cs−1 by (12)
holds with probability at least 1− δ/S. Hence, recalling that
T∑
t=1
I{Xt 6=Xt−1} ≤ KS
holds deterministically, the regret of the player over the T plays can be bounded as follows
KS +
T∑
t=1
(
µ(Xt)− µ∗
)
= KS +
S∑
s=1
Ts
|As|
∑
x∈As
(
µ(x)− µ∗)
= KS +
T1
K
K∑
i=1
(
µ(x) − µ∗)+ S∑
s=2
Ts
|As|
∑
x∈As
(
µ(x) − µ∗)
≤ KS + T1µ∗ +
S∑
i=2
4Ts
√
112(b/c)
K
Ts
ln
KS
δ
= KS + T1µ
∗ + 4
√
112(b/c)K ln
KS
δ
S∑
s=2
Ts√
Ts−1
Now, since T1 =
√
T , Ts/
√
Ts−1 =
√
T and S = O(ln lnT ), we obtain that with probability at least 1− δ the regret
is at most of order
K ln lnT + µ∗
√
T +
√
KT
(
ln
K
δ
+ ln ln lnT
)
as desired.
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B Proof of Thm. 1
As mentioned in the text, we first consider the player’s expected regret against a randomized adversary. Specifically,
we define
∀t Lt(1) =
t∑
s=1
ξs and Lt(2) = Lt(1) + Zǫ ,
where ξ1 . . . ξT are independent standard Gaussians, Z equals−1 or 1 with equal probability, and ǫ is the gap between
the losses of the two actions (which will later be set to ǫ = T−1/3).
Next, we assume for now, without loss of generality, that the player is deterministic. A deterministic player chooses
each actionXt as a deterministic function of the random losses suffered on the previous rounds,L1(X1) . . . Lt−1(Xt−1).
We can make this assumption because any randomized player strategy can be seen as a distribution over deterministic
player strategies, and since the randomization used by the adversary is independent of the player’s strategy.
In the results below, P denotes the distribution of the randomized adversary. We also introduce the conditional
distributions S = P(· | Z > 0) (i.e., 1 is the better action) and Q = P(· | Z < 0) (i.e., 2 is the better action). Since Z
has an equal probability of being negative or positive, it holds that P = 12 (S+Q).
We begin with the following technical lemma.
Lemma 1. Let I{xt−1 6=xt} indicate whether the player switched actions on round t (and 1 for t = 1). Then for any
event A, ∣∣S(A)−Q(A)∣∣ ≤ ǫ
√√√√E[ T∑
t=1
I{Xt 6=Xt−1}
]
where the expectation in the right-hand side is with respect to P.
Proof. To show this, we use the chain rule for relative entropy, which implies
DKL
(
S
∥∥ Q) = T∑
t=1
DKL
(
St−1
∥∥ Qt−1) (13)
where St−1 and Qt−1 denote the distributions of the player’s loss Lt(xt) conditioned on L1, . . . , Lt−1, when the joint
distribution of L1, . . . , LT is, respectively, S and Q.
Let us focus on a particular termDKL
(
St−1
∥∥Qt−1) and a particular realization of the random lossesL1, . . . , Lt−1.
Since we assume a deterministic player strategy, for any such realization the player’s choices x1:t are all determined,
and we deterministically have that the player either switched or not at time t. If he did not switch, then Lt(xt) is
distributed as Lt−1(xt−1)+ξt under both measures St−1 and Qt−1, so the relative entropy between them is zero. If he
did switch, then Lt(xt) is distributed as Lt−1(xt−1)− ǫ+ ξ under St−1 (where the switch is towards the best action),
and as Lt−1(xt−1) + ǫ + ξ under Qt−1 (where the switch is towards the worst action). Hence, the relative entropy
is the same as two standard Gaussians whose means are shifted by 2ǫ, namely 2ǫ2. So overall, we can upper bound
Eq. (13) by
2ǫ2 E
[
T∑
t=1
I{Xt 6=Xt−1}
∣∣∣∣Z > 0
]
. (14)
Using a similar argument, we also show that DKL
(
Q
∥∥ S) is upper bounded by Eq. (14) in which the conditioning on
Z > 0 is replaced by Z < 0. Then, Pinsker’s inequality implies that
∣∣S(A) −Q(A)∣∣2 is at most
ǫ2
2
(
E
[
T∑
t=1
I{Xt 6=Xt−1}
∣∣∣∣Z > 0
]
+ E
[
T∑
t=1
I{Xt 6=Xt−1}
∣∣∣∣Z < 0
])
= ǫ2E
[
T∑
t=1
I{Xt 6=Xt−1}
]
which gives the desired bound.
With this lemma, we can prove a lower bound on the expected regret for randomized adversaries.
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Lemma 2. By picking ǫ = T−1/3, the expected regret of any deterministic player strategy, over the randomness of the
adversary, is at least 110T
2/3
.
Proof. Let A be the event that the worst action (action 2 if Z > 0, and 1 if Z < 0) was picked by the player at least
T/2 times. Also, let ST =
∑T
t=1 I{Xt 6=Xt−1} be the number of switches the player performs. Then
E[RT ] ≥ E
[
max
{
ST ,
ǫT
2
I{A}
}]
≥ E
[
1
2
(
ST +
ǫT
2
I{A}
)]
=
1
2
E[ST ] +
ǫT
4
P(A) .
Moreover, letting A1 denote the event that the player chose action 1 at least T/2 times, and letting A2 denote the event
that the player chose action 2 at least T/2 times, we have P(A) = 12
(
S(A2) +Q(A1)
)
. Substituting this, we get
1
2
E[ST ] +
ǫT
8
(
S(A2) +Q(A1)
)
.
Using Lemma 1 to lower bound Q(A1) via S(A1), we get a lower bound of
1
2
E[ST ] +
ǫT
8
(
S(A2) + S(A1)− ǫ
√
E[ST ]
)
≥ 1
2
E[ST ] +
ǫT
8
(
S(A1 ∪ A2)− ǫ
√
E[ST ]
)
=
1
2
E[ST ] +
ǫT
8
(
1− ǫ
√
E[ST ]
)
=
1
2
E[ST ]− ǫ
2T
8
√
E[ST ] +
ǫT
8
,
where we used a union bound and the fact that either A1 or A2 always holds. This is a quadratic function of
√
E[ST ],
and it is easily verified that the lowest possible value it can attain (for any value of E[ST ]) is
ǫT
8
− ǫ
4T 2
128
.
Picking ǫ = T−1/3, this equals
(
1
8 − 1128
)
T 2/3 > 110T
2/3
.
The lemma above tells us that for the randomized adversary strategy we have devised, the expected regret for any
deterministic player is at least 110T
2/3
. This implies that there exist some deterministic adversarial strategy, for which
the expected regret of any possibly randomized player is at least 110T
2/3
. However, we are not done yet, since this
strategy doesn’t guarantee that the losses have bounded drift: In our case, the variation is governed by a potentially
unbounded Gaussian random variable, so the deterministic adversary strategy that we picked might have an arbitrarily
large drift. So now, our goal will be to show that there exists some deterministic adversarial strategy for which the
expected regret is large, and the variation is bounded. To do this, the plan is to show that the probabilities (over the
adversary’s strategy) of the two events are large, summing to a number larger than one. This means there is some
realization of the losses such that both events occur. We first state and prove two auxiliary lemmas, and then provide
two more fundamental lemmas which together give us the required result.
Lemma 3. Let Y be a random variable in [−b, b] (where b > 0), and E[Y ] ≥ c for some c ∈ [0, b/2]. Then we have
P (Y ≥ c/2) ≥ c
2b− c ≥
c
2b
.
Proof.
c ≤ E[Y ] = P(Y ≥ c/2)E[Y | Y ≥ c/2] + P(Y < c/2)E[Y | Y < c/2]
≤ P(Y ≥ c/2)b+ (1− P(Y ≥ c/2))c/2
Solving for P(Y ≥ c/2) gives the desired result.
Lemma 4. Let ξ1, ξ2, . . . be an infinite sequence of independent standard Gaussian random variables. Then for any
δ ∈ (0, 1)
P
(
∃t : |ξt| ≥
√
3 log(2t/δ)
)
≤ δ.
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Proof. By a standard Gaussian tail bound, we have that P(|ξt| > x) ≤ exp(−x2/2) for any x ≥ 0. This implies that
P(|ξt| ≥
√
3 log(2t/δ)) ≤
(
δ
2t
)3/2
.
By a union bound, we get that
P
(
∃t : |ξt| ≥
√
3 log(2t/δ)
)
≤
∞∑
t=1
(
δ
2t
)3/2
≤ δ3/2 < δ.
Lemma 5. For any (possibly randomized) player strategy, it holds that
P
(
Eplayer[RT ] ≥ 1
40
T 2/3
)
≥ 1
40
,
where P is over the adversary’s randomization, and Eplayer[RT ] is the player’s expected regret (over the player’s
randomization).
Proof. By Lemma 2, we already know that
E
[
Eplayer[RT ]
] ≥ 1
10
T 2/3, (15)
since if we have a T 2/3/10 lower bound on the regret for any deterministic player strategy, the same holds for any
randomized player strategy. Our approach is to apply Lemma 3 in order to convert this into a probability lower bound
as in the lemma statement. However, we cannot apply Lemma 3 as-is, since Eplayer[RT ] can be as large as Ω(T ), and
the resulting bound is too weak. Instead, we show that there exists a different player strategy, with expected regret
Ep˜layer[RT ], such that |Ep˜layer[RT ]| is always at most 2T 2/3 and
Ep˜layer[RT ] ≤ 2 Eplayer[RT ] (16)
for any realization of the adversary’s random strategy. Also, analogous to Eq. (15), we have E[Ep˜layer[RT ]] ≥ 110T 2/3
by Lemma 2. Therefore, using Eq. (16) and Lemma 3, we get that
P
(
Eplayer[RT ] ≥ 1
40
T 2/3
)
≥ P
(
Ep˜layer[RT ] ≥
1
20
T 2/3
)
≥ 1
40
as required.
The new player strategy we consider depends on the horizon T , and is very simple: It is identical to the original
player strategy, but whenever the number of action switches reaches ⌊T 2/3⌋, the player “freezes” in its current action,
and keeps playing the same action till T rounds are elapsed. Clearly, the number of switches with this strategy can
never be more than T 2/3, and since the regret in terms of the loss ℓt at each round is either 0 or T−1/3, we get that the
total regret RT can never be more than T 2/3 + T ∗ T−1/3 = 2T 2/3.
To prove Eq. (16), we consider some instantiation of the adversary’s random strategy, and note that for any re-
alization of the player’s random coin tosses, the regret can only differ between the two strategies if ST (the to-
tal number of switches) is at least ⌊T 2/3⌋. Therefore, we have Pplayer
(
ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋
)
= Pp˜layer
(
ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋
)
,
Pplayer
(
ST ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋
)
= Pp˜layer
(
ST ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋
)
and Eplayer[RT |ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋] = Ep˜layer[RT |ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋]. Also, we
recall that RT ≥ 0 with the adversary strategy that we consider (since one action is always worse than the other action
at all rounds). Finally, we note that if ST ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋, then the regret for both strategies is at least ⌊T 2/3⌋ (since with the
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adversary strategy that we consider, the number of switches is a lower bound on the regret). Using these observations,
we have
Ep˜layer[RT ]
= Pp˜layer(ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋)Ep˜layer[RT |ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋] + Pp˜layer(ST ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋)Ep˜layer[RT |ST ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋]
≤ Pp˜layer(ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋)Ep˜layer[RT |ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋] + Pp˜layer(ST ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋)2T 2/3
= Pplayer(ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋)Eplayer[RT |ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋] + Pplayer(ST ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋)2T 2/3
≤ 2
(
Pplayer(ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋)Eplayer[RT |ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋] + Pplayer(ST ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋)T 2/3
)
≤ 2
(
Pplayer(ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋)Eplayer[RT |ST < ⌊T 2/3⌋] + Pplayer(ST ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋)Eplayer[RT |ST ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋]
)
= 2 Eplayer[RT ],
where in the second-to-last step we used the fact that if ST ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋, then the regret is at least ⌊T 2/3⌋, plus we must
have picked the worst action (worst by T−1/3 than the best action) at least Ω(T 2/3) times, hence the total regret is
certainly at least T 2/3.
Finally, we use Lemma 4 with δ = 1/80, to get that with probability at least 1 − 1/80, the drift factor Dt of the
adversarial strategy is at most
√
3 log(160t) ≤
√
3 log(t) + 16 for all t. Moreover, Lemma 5 tells us that Eplayer[RT ]
is at least 140T
2/3 with probability at least 1/40. This implies that the intersection of the two events is non-empty, and
there exists some deterministic adversarial strategy, such that the driftDt ≤
√
3 log(t) + 16 for all t, and the expected
regret is at least 140T
2/3 as required.
C Proof of Thm. 2
Thm. 1 guarantees that given any player’s strategy, there is some deterministic adversary strategy with a lower bound
on the regret. However, as part of proving Thm. 1, we actually showed that there exists some randomized adversary
strategy {fˆt}Tt=1 with memory size 1, such that for any (possibly randomized) player strategy x1:t,
E
[
T∑
t=1
fˆt(Xt−1, Xt)−min
x∈A
T∑
t=1
fˆt(x, x)
]
≥ 1
10
T 2/3 (17)
(see Lemma 2). We now use this strategy to define a randomized adversary strategy for our setting (with memory size
2), for a game of T + 1 rounds. We let f1(x1) = 0 for any x1, f2(x1, x2) = fˆ1(x1), and for every t = 3 . . . T + 1,
ft(xt−2, xt−1, xt) = fˆt−1(xt−2, xt−1) . (18)
Now, suppose we had some (possibly randomized) player strategy X1 . . . XT+1, so that in expectation over the player
and adversary strategies, we have
E
[
T+1∑
t=1
ft(Xt−2, Xt−1, Xt)−min
x∈A
T+1∑
t=1
ft(x, x, x)
]
<
1
10
T 2/3.
In particular, since f1 is always 0, it would imply that
E
[
T+1∑
t=2
ft(Xt−2, Xt−1, Xt)−min
x∈A
T+1∑
t=2
ft(x, x, x)
]
<
1
10
T 2/3 .
By Eq. (18), this implies
E
[
T∑
t=1
fˆt(Xt−1, Xt)−min
x∈A
T∑
t=1
fˆt(x, x)
]
<
1
10
T 2/3 .
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Thus, if we could implement the player strategy X1 . . . XT in the bandits-with-switching-costs setting, it will contra-
dict Eq. (17). To see that this indeed can happen, note that each Xt is a (possibly randomized) function of X1:t−1
as well as {fτ (Xτ−2, Xτ−1, Xτ )}t−1τ=1. But again, due to Eq. (18) and the fact that f1 is always 0, Xt can in fact be
defined using X1:t−1 and {
fτ (Xτ−2, Xτ−1, Xτ )
}t−1
τ=2
=
{
fˆτ−1(Xτ−2, Xτ−1)
}t−1
τ=2
.
The right hand side is an observable quantity in the bandit setting: In each round t, we know what are the set of losses
{fˆτ−1(Xτ−2, Xτ−1)}t−1τ=2 that we obtained. Thus, we can simulate the strategy x1:t in the bandit-with-switching-costs
setting, and get an expected regret smaller than 110T
2/3
, contradicting Eq. (17). Thus, the expected regret (for a game
of T + 1 rounds) must be at least 110T 2/3. Substituting T instead of T + 1, we get that the expected regret for a game
with T rounds is at least 110 (T − 1)2/3.
The regret bound we just now obtained is in expectation over the randomized adversary strategy, and holds for any
player’s strategy. We now use the same line of argument as in the last part of Thm. 1’s proof, to show that for any
(possibly randomized) player’s strategy, there exists some deterministic adversary strategy, with a similar expected
regret bound, and with losses of bounded drift. Specifically, a result completely analogous to Lemma 5 implies that
P
(
Eplayer[RT ] ≥ 1
40
(T − 1)2/3
)
≥ 1
40
(
T − 1
T
)2/3
,
which is at least 1/80 for any T > 1 (if T = 1 the bound in the theorem is trivial from the non-negativity of RT
for the adversary strategy that we consider). Moreover, using Eq. (4) as in the proof of Thm. 1, the probability of
the loss drift being at most
√
3 log(320t) ≤
√
3 log(t) + 18 is at least 1 − 1/160. Thus, the intersection of the two
events is not empty, and this implies that there exists some deterministic adversary strategy causing expected regret
≥ 140 (T − 1)2/3, and loss drift at most
√
3 log(t) + 18 for all t.
D Proofs of Upper Bounds
Proof of Thm. 3. Each loss functions equals ft(x1:t) = ℓ(xt) + I{xt 6=xt−1}, where ℓt is an oblivious loss function.
Since the range of ft is contained in an interval of size C, the range of ℓt must be contained in an interval of size
C − 1. In other words,
∀x ∈ A ℓt(x)−min
y
ℓt(y) ≤ C − 1 .
Therefore, by definition, the range of ℓ′t is contained in the interval [0, 1], and the analysis of the FLL algorithm holds.
Namely, if X1, X2, . . . is the sequence of actions chosen by FLL, then, for any T
E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓ′t(Xt)
]
−min
x∈A
T∑
t=1
ℓ′t(x) = O(
√
T ) , (19)
and
E
[
T∑
t=1
I{Xt 6=Xt−1}
]
= O(
√
T ) . (20)
Plugging the definition of ℓ′t into Eq. (19) and rearranging terms, we get
E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓt(Xt)
]
−min
x∈A
ℓt(x) = (C − 1)O(
√
T ) .
Summing the above with Eq. (20) gives
E
[
T∑
t=1
ft(X1:t)
]
−min
x∈A
ft(x . . . x) = O(C
√
T ) .
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Proof of Thm. 4. Recall that ft(x1:t) = 12(C+D) (ℓt(xt)− ℓt−1(xt−1)) + 12 , and note that our assumptions imply that
|ℓt(xt)− ℓt−1(xt−1)| = |ℓt(xt)− ℓt−1(xt) + ℓt−1(xt)− ℓt−1(xt−1)|
≤ |ℓt(xt)− ℓt−1(xt)|+ |ℓt−1(xt)− ℓt−1(xt−1)|
≤ D + C .
Therefore, f ′t(x1:t) is always bounded in [0, 1] and the analysis of Exp3.P holds. Although f ′t is not an oblivious loss,
the standard regret bounds for Exp3.P holds against adaptive adversaries. Namely, if X1:T is the sequence of actions
chosen by Exp3.P, then
E
[
T∑
t=1
f ′t(X1:t)−min
x∈A
T∑
t=1
f ′t(X1:t−1, x)
]
= O(
√
T ) .
Using the definition if f ′t , the left hand side above can be rewritten as
1
2(C +D)
E
[
T∑
t=1
(
ℓt(Xt)− ℓt−1(Xt−1)
)−min
x∈A
T∑
t=1
(
ℓt(x) − ℓt−1(Xt−1)
)]
=
1
2(C +D)
E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓt(Xt)−min
x∈A
T∑
t=1
ℓt(x)
]
.
Therefore,
E[RT ] = E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓt(Xt)−min
x∈A
T∑
t=1
ℓt(x)
]
= 2(C +D)O(
√
T ) .
Using the assumption that Dt = O
(√
log(T )
)
, we conclude that E[RT ] = O˜(C
√
T ).
Proof of Thm. 5. First, note that, due to the bounded range and drift assumptions, f̂t ∈ [0, 1]. Also note that
ft(xt−m:t)− ft(x . . . x) = 2
(
C + (m+ 1)D
)(
f̂t(xt−m:t)− f̂t(x . . . x)
)
.
As previously mentioned, we divide the T rounds into J consecutive epochs of the same length T/J , where T/J ≥
2K(m+ 1), plus an additional final epoch of length at most T/J . We let tj denote the index of the first round in the
j-th epoch. We run a mini-batched version of the Hedge algorithm Freund and Schapire [1997] over the epochs: at the
beginning of each epoch j, Hedge draws an action Xj ∈ A which is played consistently throughout the epoch. Now
assume that at the end of each epoch j, loss estimates gj(x) ∈ [0, 1] for each action x are available such that
E
[
gj(x)
]
=
1
T/J − 2m− 1
tj+1−1∑
t=tj+2m+1
f̂t(x . . . x)
where the randomness used to compute each gj is independent of that used by Hedge to draw Xj . At the end of epoch
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j, we feed loss estimates gj(x) for each x ∈ A to Hedge. The resulting regret can be bounded as follows,
T∑
t=1
E
[
ft(Xt−m:t)− ft(x . . . x)
]
≤
J∑
j=1
tj+1−1∑
t=tj
E
[
ft(Xt−m:t)− ft(x . . . x)
]
+
CT
J
= 2
(
C + (m+ 1)D
) J∑
j=1
tj+2m∑
t=tj
E
[
f̂t(Xt−m:t)− f̂t(x . . . x)
]
+ 2
(
C + (m+ 1)D
) J∑
j=1
tj+1−1∑
t=tj+2m+1
E
[
f̂t(Xj . . .Xj)− f̂t(x . . . x)
]
+
CT
J
≤ 2(C + (m+ 1)D)(2m+ 1)J
+ 2
(
C + (m+ 1)D
)T
J
E
 J∑
j=1
E
[
gj(Xj)− gj(x)
∣∣∣Xj]
+ CT
J
= 2
(
C + (m+ 1)D
)
(2m+ 1)J
+ 2
(
C + (m+ 1)D
)T
J
E
 J∑
j=1
(
gj(Xj)− gj(x)
)+ CT
J
≤ 2(C + (m+ 1)D)(2m+ 1)J + 4(C + (m+ 1)D)T
J
√
J lnK +
CT
J
.
In the last step we applied the known upper bound on the regret of Hedge with respect to losses gj ∈ [0, 1], where K
is the number of actions. This is valid if, in particular, losses gj are oblivious. We now explain how to obtain oblivious
estimates gj with the desired properties. At the beginning of each epoch j, we use the independent randomization to
draw K exploration steps {tx : x ∈ A} from the set Tj = {tj , . . . , tj+1 − 2m − 2} with the property that these
steps are well separated. Namely, between any two tx and tx′ there are at least 2m + 1 consecutive free time steps
in Tj . During epoch j, when we arrive at step tx we freeze Hedge and play action x0 for m + 1 time steps, then we
play action x for m+ 1 more time steps. We use the two observed losses ftx+m(x0 . . . x0) and ftx+2m+1(x . . . x) to
compute f̂tx+2m+1(x . . . x). Because the tx are well separated, the exploration steps do not interfere with each other.
Suppose now that we can draw these points such that the marginal of each tx is uniform in Tj . Then
E
[
f̂tx+2m+1(x . . . x)
]
=
1
T/J − 2m− 1
tj+1−2m−2∑
t=tj
f̂t+2m+1(x . . . x)
=
1
T/J − 2m− 1
tj+1−1∑
t=tj+2m+1
f̂t(x . . . x) .
This shows that f̂tx+2m+1(x . . . x) is a valid estimate gj(x). Moreover, for each x ∈ A the quantity f̂tx+2m+1(x . . . x)
does not depend on Hedge’s actionXj for the current epoch j. It does not even depend on Hedge’s past actions. Hence,
Hedge is indeed run on a set of oblivious losses and the standard regret bound applies.
The last thing to prove is that we can draw {tx : x ∈ A} ⊂ Tj such that the marginal of each tx is uniform in
Tj . Note that giving equal probability to all well separated configurations of {tx : x ∈ A} does not work, because
the times steps closer to the beginning and to the end of Tj appear in more configurations (for example, check the case
|Tj | = 8 and m = 1). This problem can be fixed simply by arranging the points of Tj on a circle, so that the first point
tj follows the last point tj+1 − 2m − 2, and then enforcing well-separatedness on the circle. This makes the sample
space completely symmetric, excluding those configurations of exploration points that exploited border effects.
19
The additional regret due to the computation of the K exploration points is 2(m + 1)CK per epoch. The final
regret, including these additional costs, is then bounded by
2
(
C + (m+ 1)D
)
(2m+ 1)J + 4
(
C + (m+ 1)D
)T
J
√
J lnK +
CT
J
+ 2(m+ 1)CKJ .
Choosing J of order T 2/3 concludes the proof.
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